University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (ASC)

Annenberg School for Communication

5-17-2004

Peaceable Kingdoms and Information Technology
Carolyn Marvin
University of Pennsylvania, cmarvin@asc.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers
Part of the Communication Technology and New Media Commons

Recommended Citation (OVERRIDE)
Marvin, C. (2004, May 17). Peaceable Kingdoms and Information Technology in M. Sturken, D. Thomas,
and S. Ball-Rokeach, eds., Technological Visions: The Hopes and Fears that Shape New Technologies (pp.
240-254). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/612
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Peaceable Kingdoms and Information Technology
Disciplines
Communication | Communication Technology and New Media | Social and Behavioral Sciences

This book chapter is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/612

University of Pennsylvania Libraries

NOTICE W ARNING CONCERNING COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS

The copyright law of the United States (title 17, United States Code) governs the
making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material.
Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are
authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specific
conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any
purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.” If a user makes a
request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of
“fair use,” that user may be liable for copyright infringement.
This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its
judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law.
This notice is posted in compliance with Title 37 C.F.R., Chapter II, Part 201.14

CAROLYN MARVIN

13

Peaceable Kingdoms and
New Information Technologies
Prospects for the Nation-State

How WILL global commm1ications tedrnologies transform the
nation-state? Could they threate11 its existence as the linchpin of the international system? Those 1,vho·ponder new technologies gathering steam in
the early twenty-first century and the ponderously creaky social formation
called the nation-state disagree about the likely outcome of the collision
between them. Some prophets have imagined an end to two centuries of
nation~state tribalism and armed conflict. Otl\er visions sketch pm,verful
nation-states hemorrhaging sovereignty from onslaughts by predatory supercapitalism. Dramatic fantasies of doom and salvation have always accompanied shifts in communications technology. They are less informative
about the likely character of the future than about important strains in the
social structure of societies experiencing technological change. 1
Social distance changes when technological innovation raises or lowers
customary communicative barrkrs, Writing, telegxaphy, and telephony all
have transformed social distance in this fashion. Today we arev,ritness to the
restless and continuing reorganization of local, intermedial'e, and global social distances by the Internet, cell phones, instant messaging, tape cassettes,
compact disks, digital imagery, and more on the way. It would be surprising if major shifts Jn how humans con1municate vvith one another had no
important implications for social structure. At the level of lived existence,
social structure is visibly anchored by conventions of proper social distance
in face-to-face exchanges between persons of similar or different statuses.
Related conventions govern mediated interaction. Such rules govern public and private boundaries and generate proced01es for establishing tmst
1n role encounters, The most visible shifts in communication technology rearrange familiar social distances and imperil this carefully calibrated social
trust. Because they are both unsettling and excitin~ such rearrangements
are a prominent theme of popular culture, which faithfully registers popular desires and fears that emerge from them.
240
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It would be hard to conclude from inspecting contemporary popular
culture that the fate of nations as nations hangs in the balance of new communications technologies from the perspective of most citizens, however.
According to popular discourse, new communications technologies affect
morality, and not for the better. Likewise affected are civility and various
kinds of authority, including parental authority, many forms of professional
authority, and the private authority citizens have over information about
their own lives. But the stability of the nation-state seems secure in popular
imagination. (This is a different matter than the fate of particular nationstates, which always hangs in the balance.) Popular assessments do not
guarantee that drastic political consequences do not lie ahead. They do
mean that popular identification with nation-state belonging is an especially stable feature of modern social and personal identity.
Communicatively speaking, nation-states descend from eighteenthcentury newspapers, nineteenth-century telegraphy, and twentieth-century
broadcasting. Measured against the history of other significant communications technologies, digital technologies thus seem destined for large political consequences, popular assessments notwithstanding. Discussion on
this point is necessarily speculative, and humility is definitely in order for
any effort to discern through a glass darkly the long-term consequences
of technological change. Still, with no thought that nation-state forms are
eternal or inevitable, it is far from obvious that the nation-state will be a
front-line casualty of new forms of global communications. Nation-states
are likely to weather the transformations of digital technology for a long
time to come.
How shifts in communications set in motion transforming cultural shifts
has always preoccupied theorists of the grand sweep, for whom print offers
the prototype example. One of the best known, Elizabeth Eisenstein, argues
that the cultural episode we call the Renaissance flowed directly from the
diffusion of printing. 2 She also gives print a propelling role in two powerful
ideologies of Western modernity, early modern science and Protestantism.
For Harold Innis, the transformative power of printing is a function of the
dramatic expansion it made possible in cultural memory, and in its exponential enlargement of the transmission and distribution of information.
Computing likewise vastly amplifies cultural memory (the dimension Innis calls "time-binding") 3 and transmission and distribution in real time
(which Innis calls "space-binding"). For Innis, communication technologies
that bind both space and time in new ways, as printing did and computing
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now does, foster geographically large, politically centralized forms of empire. The United States is this kind of empire.
Benedict Anderson ties his grand argument about print to felt solidarity more than to increases in mechanical capacity. He argues that the emergence of nation-states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the direct outcome of the diffusion through print of nationalist senti1nent. Shared
written vernaculars linked colonial bureaucratic elites in "imagined communities" that nourished new-nation sensibilities. Anderson sees modern
nations as communities of strangers imagining one another as comrades
through shared texts that provide the affective bonds of nationhood. 4 If, in
fact, community boundaries are as malleable as printed imaginings of them
are fluid and abundant, global communities are possible because global
texts may be distributed with little effort. But there is a gap in Anderson's
formulation between the moral sentiments people have and the claim that
these convictions arise automatically from the existence of an appropriate
vehicle along which they may travel.
Nation-states are not simply well-coordinated daydreams of language
and information. They are communities of moral obligation whose members' bodies are committed to mutual common defense. Such commitments
include sacrifices willingly undertaken by citizens and acquiescence to the
state's willingness to compel citizen sacrifice through conscription and
other means. "Where popular readiness for sacrifice is lacking, visible state
compulsion will imperil national unity and purpose. The Vietnam War provides the living memory example for the United States. Mere diffusion of
information and propaganda proved unable to persuade a large enough
majority of citizens that North Vietnam posed a threat to American national
security. Where lives and not only words are at stake, more than mere textual imagination of new political forms is needed to create or sustain the
affective glue of enduring group cohesion. By the same logic, there is a
missing piece in most assessments of the role digital technologies will have
in the larger political transformations we might expect them to facilitate.

WHAT IS ESSENTIAL TO COLLECTIVE IDENTITY?

To resolve this issue we must consider the nation as the locus of collective
identity for its citizens. Among all the overlapping communities of iden<
tity to which modern persons belong, why does the rhetoric of sweeping;
technological change focus especially on nations? Eric Hobsbawm puts the11
puzzle this way:
·
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[the nation-state] is, in Benedict Anderson's useful phrase, an "imaged community/' and no doubt this can be made to fill the emotional void
left by the retreat or disintegration, or the unavailability of real human
communities and networks, but the question still remains why, having
lost real communities, people should wish to imagine this particular type
of replacement. 5
we could say why nation-states constitute the core group of belonging in
odernity, as Liah Greenfeld and other theorists of nationalism insist they
, we might better understand the cohesive dynamics of contemporary
mm unities and better predict the likely rearrangements of time and space
hat digital technologies will encourage. 6
Hobsbawm has no doubt that there exists a real human community, even
' humans have somehow contrived to lose it. How this could happen is
ot a trivial question, but I take Hobsbawm to be asserting a foundational
ttmode for human society. He perhaps implies that "reaY' communities are
{\ organized around face-to-face interaction, which makes possible the au~, thentic connections upon which "real" communities depend. At the very
;: least, more bodies cannot be made without such interaction! 7 I believe the
same applies to collective action for solving the most difficult tasks of survival, and propose that what makes nations the key source of political identity for modern people is that national communities are the most potent
bloodletters, the most visible users of bodies in the contemporary world. To
paraphrase Weber's description of the state, sovereignty at its most basic is
having legitimate killing authority. 8 Citizenship is a relation of submission
to such killing authority.
Without bodies, society is impossible, to be more concrete about it. The
more removed from immediate bodily presence the community of belonging is from those who must be persuaded to belong to it, the more dramatic
must be the means of overcoming the gap that mediated forms open up
between belonging as a moral relationship and intimacy as an experiential condition. Where members have personal experience of all other members in small-scale societies, there is no gap between belonging and intimacy. Where connections are attenuated by distance and mediated through
texts-in the sprawling industrialized nations where readers of this essay
are likely to live-ties of compelling psychological and social power must
be generated in the absence of physically intimate bonds that unite members of face-to-face communities.
How to bind the loyalties of the foot soldiers who must be enlisted
to project nation-state power abroad and ensure domestic tranquility at
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home-and the loyalties of the families that offer them? It is no accident
that Clausewitzian total war was invented and theorized contemporaneously with the rise of the nation-state. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was
a Prussian officer and veteran of German and Russian campaigns against
both the French Revolutionary Army and Napoleon in the regimental system that antedates modern nation-state military organization. Regimental
armies were invented by absolutist rulers seeking an end to the structural
instabilities of feudalism. In that system rulers were required to reward
noble princes with land for fighting men and services rendered. Through
strategic alliances and the acquisition of ever more territory, ambitious feudal lords might contrive to topple the rulers they served only to become
vulnerable themselves in an endless, exhausting cycle of bloodshed and
conquest. 9
Regiments, or standing armies, changed this. Skills in the strategic command of men at war were transferred from an aristocratic class of princes to
a bureaucratized officer corps forbidden to acquire territorial holdings. In
exchange for fighting services, men at arms were housed and maintained
permanently at the ready by the sovereign power. By this means a ruler with
a body of dedicated landless fighting men at his disposal no longer faced
the nobility as a rival military power. 10 The nobility was brought into court,
a waning decorative testament to a dying social system. Standing armies required two innovations. Royal taxation of a merchant bourgeoisie anxious
to have peace for the sake of commercial enterprise solved the economic
problem of sustaining permanent armed bodies of landless men. And cul-·
tivation among the citizenry of a willingness to make any sacrifice at all in
the service of the nation, an ethic of total war, provided both justification
and engine for social and psychological unity.
Clausewitzian theories of war were conceived within the assumptions
of emerging centralized states. Lawful bearers of arms bound.to surrender
their lives to authority on demand were distinguished from irregular soldiers outside disciplined authority. Our image of total war is masses of men
standing in rows, slaughtering and being slaughtered, perhaps for hours at
a time. Such wars of attrition became the blood sacrifice rituals of nationstates partly because they aroused emotions of religious intensity and force.
The ritual lesson of total war is that Durkheimian sentiments of solidarity
manifest as nationalism can be generated where-but more to the point,,
only if-blood sacrifice is great enough to trump competing ties of kinship,
ethnicity, class, and religion that threaten it. Large numbers of casualties
unify the community by equalizing the sacrifices of citizens. A large sacri
0
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fi.ce guarantees that blood, the most magical of bodily substances, sooner or
touches everyone in the group. Soldiers are touched directly. All who
are connected to them by kinship or close affiliation are indirectly touched.
The greater the number of soldiers sacrificed (short of a sacrifice too great
for the group to sustain itself, which possibility is used to wring ever greater
dedication from t~ose who are called), the more demanding and personal
is the shared ordeal of every member of the community in sending them,
and the larger the community that may be thus unified. Where men have
lost what Hobsbawm calls a "real" community, only conditions this severe
can generate a shared bond equivalent in moral strength to those long associated with face-to-face social intimacy.
Compared to one knit together by blood rituals, can such solidarity
be generated in the famously imagined Andersonian textual community?
Events experienced in one's own skin provide the deepest forms of emotional life available to humans. Textual experience is derivative by definition.11 Though Anderson never systematically considers the content of
national texts, these contribute to solidarity largely by cementing bodily
sacrifice to nationalism. The specific examples of national texts Anderson
puts forward are of exactly this kind, though he fails to notice that the crucial mechanism of connection is sacrifice rather than print, which provides
a necessary means of distribution but not the engine of motivation. And
though shared texts disseminate and amplify knowledge of sacrificial bodies, texts simply as texts cannot create the compelling feelings of responsibility we call patriotic obligation and guilt. In rituals of national solidarity,
texts play a supporting liturgical role. There is no substitute for real blood
shed by striving and suffering bodies in producing the conviction of shared
national kinship.
The limiting size of political communities, therefore, is not only how
much physical territory can be coordinated and integrated through systems
of transportation and communication, nor even the number of people that
can be kept in line by force. The size of political communities is limited by
the size of a population for which it is possible to enlist men's deepest moral
sympathies through body-to-body ties. The farther-reaching the links of movement and message, the more citizens are bound to be physical and moral
strangers to one another. The more citizens are strangers, the more dramatic
and compelling-the more violent-must be the rituals that elicit their willingness to sacrifice despite (and frequently in defiance of) family, religion,
and other body-based affiliations that compete for moral supremacy and
have the capacity to derail or destroy national purpose. Texts play a critical
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role in recalling past national sacrifice. But without real bodies to back them,
as gold backs currency, and without periodically renewed ritual offerings
of those bodies that constitute the real treasure of the community, enduring
groups can neither maintain themselves or address serious threats to their
existence.
All this sounds strangely primitive in an era when textual authority is
plainly powerful. In the modern West, it might be said that all bodies are
disciplined with respect to literacy. Some are disciplined in its use, others
are disciplined to keep away from it. Social distinctions based in literate
practice separate those who use and expend their bodies in physical work
from those with relative discretion to preserve and protect their physical
bodies from labor and hardship. Those with access to literate currencies
learn to conceal their bodies in the production and manipulation of literate
signs through costly strategems of self-control. It is the privilege of the preserved body to remain concealed within and protected by the practices and
products of literacy. Compared to the less socially esteemed body, which
remains relatively more visible and unprotected, suppression of the body
is the condition of literate achievement. 12
Those whose cultural power depends on controlling the production and
reception of texts make up the textual classes. Those who depend on the labor of their bodies, who cannot conceal themselves behind texts, comprise
the bodily classes. In Western history the agonistic play of texts against bodies was propelled decisively forward by the Reformation, a deep and sustained attack on traditional body-based forms of ritual magic in the name
of textual authority. 13 For the performative magic of bodies, manifest in the
transmutation of bread and wine, curing the sick, and even baptism, the
sixteenth-century Reformation substituted an equally magical commitment
to textual authority and practice, manifest as correct scriptural belief. Now
focused on the system of secular constitutional law, reverence for literate
authority still undergirds the system for conferring and distributing social
resources and prestige in modern industrialized societies. 14
Textual communities do not engage in blood fighting. They leave this
task to the body classes. In textual communities, intellectuals are front men.
Stereotypically not in control of their own bodies, ridiculed as asexual, powerless to command other bodies, intellectuals legitimize textuality to the
bodily classes. Existing at the sufferance of more powerful (textual) elites
than they, they are charged to idealize textual sensibilities as noble, ethereal, and morally exalted. The body class learns its subordinate social place
from these textual class missionaries. Through rituals of cultural deference,
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body class members are schooled not to notice that the true power of the
textual class consists of controlling and disposing of the bodies of nontextual classes.
Electronically mediated communications are simply the most contemporary form of textualized messages. Like texts that have preceded them,
digital texts are abstracted from the bodies that produce and receive them.
Like these texts, they are endlessly duplicated and effortlessly distributed.
Even digital prophets who expect nation-states to recede as residues of a
primitive past, replaced by text-based digital communities, are historically
familiar. The vision of a universal textual language that links metropolitan
cultures while effacing traditional rural populations recalls Enlightenment
elites who offered this dream to liberal cosmopolites of eighteenth-century
Europe. Internationalism, observes Tom Nairn, has always been the ideology of rnetropole intelligentsia, not rural peasantry or the countryside. 15
Literate elites benefit first and disproportionately from new textual technologies. They reinforce their elite positions by absorbing and dominating
these technologies. They imagine the extension and triumph of their technology over all others. They have a stake in ignoring the sacrifice of nonelite
bodies to support their dominant position. In industrialized countries, this
sacrifice is exacted especially from police and soldiers whose bodies guarantee the safety of textual elites through forcible expulsion of illegal immigrants, and from the poor who lack textual skills for amassing cultural
capital in the struggle for status. These dispossessed fight back with their
bodies-and mostly lose.

VISIONS OF THE GOOD STATE

In fairness, the vision of a universal culture is not limited to the textual class.
If societies may be broadly classed as dominated by textual or bodily elites,
there are instances enough of the latter. With the instructive exception of
Nazism, bodily elites have not been dominant in the ~odern West. In recent history, Khmer Rouge nationalists forced urban-educated elites into
the countryside to labor for Pol Pot's body-dominated ruling cadres. The
Taliban of Afghanistan visited draconian spectacles of punishment on those
who failed to comply with the strict bodily observances mandated by their
own brand of Islam. Mao's Great Leap forward was launched in the name
of a utopia of the body and the political subordination of the textual classes.
The brutality of bodily regimes is more visible than that of textual regimes,
their injustices more easily recognized and denounced from outside. Falling
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behind in a society dominated by textual elites has a more hidden profile
since less literate and nonliterate groups lack means and skill to call effective
outside attention to the economic and physical violence visited on them.
The chains of social and economic dependence are also longer in textualized regimes than in regimes of the body. Elaborated, textually mediated
connections between power-holders and those at the mercy of power are
not only less visible, the less participants know one another, but arguably
more difficult to intervene in as well.
Those who foresee a decline in nation-state sovereignty do not argue
that nation-states are too big or too small or otherwise unable to provide
physical protection and sustenance to their citizens. After 200 years it is
clear that the administrative and political form of the nation-state offers a
stable foundation for productive societies. Prophets of nationalism's demise
claim that digital teclmologies portend a centrifugal denationalizing power
of irresistible force. This is a surprising claim if we consider that other
distance- and time-annihilating communications technologies-telegraphy,
radio, and television-have expanded rather than contracted the power of
nation-states.
Prophets of denationalization like Jean-Marie Guehenno and Francis
Fukuyama argue that the digital "despatialization" of the world spells the
"end of politics" and the nation-state as the most prominent of political
structures. 16 Just as Daniel Bell once proclaimed that information age technologies portended the "end of ideology," Francis Fukuyama has claimed
that history, conventionally understood as dramas of nation-state strife, is at
an end. 17 His version of technological transformation proposes a Hegelian
progression from nationalism to liberal democracy, a view also advanced by
early twentieth-century thinkers such as Durkheim in France and Dewey in
the United States. 18 A less sanguine stages-of-history argument is offered by
theorists who take to heart Marx's admonition that the existence of nationstates has lo~g permitted capitalists to divert workers from their true class
interests. These critics hope for the end of what Fukuyama labels the thymic
aspects of nationalism-chauvinism, ethnocentrism, racism, fascism, and
militarism. Thus Jolm Lukacs observes that the struggle of the twentieth
century was not a struggle of classes but nations.
What could replace the tottering nation-state? Benjamin Barber, Wilson
Dizard, and Walter B. Wriston predict that increasing economic interdependence across political borders will prevail over political interests that fuel
armed conflict. 19 The European Union (EU) offers a hopeful model for proponents of this view. It is also an ambiguous one since its success rests on
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the political stability of its nation-state members. A successful EU would
not resemble a new political form so much as a superstate of those now
comprising it. Still, Samuel Huntington has warned that commercial contacts are a dubious thread on which to hang hopes for peace. 20 No nations
were more economically interdependent than Germany and France in August 1914, or the Germans and the Soviets in June 1941. 21 Commerce is as
likely to inform people about their differences as their commonalities. One
of the lessons of the antebellum U.S. Post Office was that mail from Northern abolitionists inflamed Southern resentment toward the North wherever
it circulated. Increased communication may as easily sharpen conflict as
promote harmony.
The debate over America Online' s policy of removing individual subscribers and messages that "harass, threaten, embarrass, or do anything
else to another member that is unwarranted" offers a quick snapshot of the
issues that surround digitally communicated conflict. The issue here is instructive because it represents no great challenge to nation-state peace and
security. It simply offers a window on the quotidian comings and goings
of social exchange in the cyberage. 22 By excluding the rude, America Online hopes to minimize conflict and provide an atmosphere of civility for
millions of subscribers. The unmourned victim of this policy is open democratic communication in which conflict is no less likely than harmony to
manifest itself. If America Online' s goal is not democratic access for the rude
and civil alike, but eliminating uncivil disagreement, powerful compulsory
restraints must be applied. These will always serve the most entrenched notions of the status quo. The tactics of pacification never eliminate force. They
simply disguise it. America Online itself exists only so long as a nation-state
able to exercise force is willing to defend it. All nation-states, even the most
democratic, are supported by violence, even when they have learned to hide
it behind layers of distracting text.
Invent the printing press, Thomas Carlyle is supposed to have said in an
early version of the optimism that drives utopian prophets of globalization,
and democracy is inevitable. Apparently not. The printing press has been
as useful to entrenched totalitarian states as to model democracies. If electronic communications were inherently democratizing, we could depend
on "technologies of freedom" simply to wear down the hierarchies that frustrate democracy. 23 But technological form provides no democratic guarantees. Global communications systems often require expressly undemocratic
centralizing infrastructures in order to stay up and running. If global electronic communications could further democracy, would this be a gain for
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world peace? James Lee Ray asserts that liberal democracies have never
attacked one another by force of arms. 24 He also acknowledges that democracies have not been reluctant to initiate war against nondemocracies or to
colonize vulnerable peoples. Having divested themselves of colonial empires in the twentieth century, the most powerful among them project force
geopolitically through client states caught in webs of dependence that constantly threaten escalating conflicts. 25 The notion that citizens linked by new
forms of communication will have no motivation to fuel the passions of nationalism simply disregards the history of nation-state violence by democracies and nondemocracies alike.
I hasten to acknowledge that the arguments put forward here apply
to textual, or explicitly re-presentational, technologies. Were forms of virtual interaction to become genuinely indistinguishable from face-to-face
encounters, all bets are off. I am prepared to believe that body re-forming
technologies might present genuine alternatives to the body-based moral
communities of nation-states. In fanciful visions from teleportation to human cloning, they constitute the limiting case for the present analysis.

THE POLITICS OF THE BODY

However secure their political form for the near term, nation-states do
face significant challenges in an era of globalized computing. The perception that bodies are increasingly detached from "real" human communities
offers a vantage point from which groups whose livelihoods are directly
threatened, and whose cultural and social authority is greatly reduced by
digital technologies will interpret their situation and consider their options.
They include workers who provide personal services (e.g., travel agents,
financial consultants, real-estate brokers, messengers, traveling salesmen,
private-practice physicians) that can be offered more efficiently and extensively by new technologies, or whose consumers can be cream-skimmed
by electronically based providers. They include educators, librarians, and
other petty bourgeois members of the textual class whose professional authority is eroded by networked databases and automated retrieval systems.
They include body class workers in domestic manufacf:uring whose living
standards have declined along with these industries. They include those
who lack basic literacy skills, and are able to command only the most menial of jobs in the digital economy.
Those who experience the erosion of bodily authority as a loss of social
power experience it as the destruction of morality, civility, authority,
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autonomy. At home and abroad, such groups may be expected to resort
to rituals of restoring the purified body to power. In the United States a
presidential impeachment focused around the sexually scandalous (and
lying, finger-pointing) body was consistent with such anxiety. So are moral
panics about sex and violence; health issues such as smoking and irradiated food; and perceived assaults on the family such as gay marriage,
abortion, and priestly pedophilia. The politics of the body is registered in
increased resistance to immigration and other expressions of tribal resistance to impure bodies. It predicts ever greater hostility from those who,
lacking textual skills, find themselves on the wrong side of the global and
national economy. Nor should we be surprised to see enhanced punishments (more prisons incarcerating more bodies and lesser crimes punished
with penalties that display the stigmatized body to the community) for
bodily crimes from murder to prostitution. We can expect the rhetoric of
alarm eventually to embrace computing itself as a threat to the nation-state
(the Taliban, for example, forbade computing on the grounds that monitors
could receive forbidden images). Such expressions already haunt the political discourse of marginalized body-class groups who fear conspiracies
by international textual elites such as the United Nations and the Trilateral
Commission.
That the modern technologically integrated state will strike with special
vengeance against body-based challenges is also clear. Terrorism is the obvious case. Consider also domestic hate crimes, which increase penalties for
violent assaults motivated by prejudice against bodies that are symbolically
privileged in the current political climate-minorities, women, gays. Such
penalties demonstrate to members of the body class, the primary perpetrators of bias crimes, that angry efforts at retribution for the raw deal they perceive themselves to have from a society that disdains the bodies they offer
will be dealt with more severely than text-based injustices. Red-lining, employment discrimination, and corporate consolidation are deeds on paper
that eliminate jobs, pensions, and health care. For those without recourse to
the textual machinery of expensive litigation or relatively protected textualclass employment, these deprivations result in lost life opportunities. Textual class crimes may be less visibly brutal than hate crimes but are no less
determinative of the life courses of their victims, and the number of their
victims is significantly greater. Thus do the social sorting mechanisms of a
textual society deflect and devalue the body class and keep it under control,
not least by keeping its members divided against themselves.
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CONCLUSION

Nation-states are the form that human tribes take in a technological world.
Though digital technology may support and re-present blood sacrifice to
citizens as print and broadcasting have done before it, the existence of
nation-states requires forms of blood commitment by citizens for which,
finally, there is no substitute. Texts give central authorities far-reaching
power to monitor bodies at a distance. Such coordination has been among
the chief contributions of computing technology to nation-state power. But
if texts, including digital texts, provide the means, they cannot provide the
distinctive glue of group loyalty. To replace the nation-state with alternative
moral communities will require new rituals of sacrifice and fertility able to
compete with nation-state war in emotional scale and power. Such rituals
are not impossible to imagine; they could well make total wars of attrition
look limited and civilized. They should give us great pause. If nation-states
turn out not to be adequate suppliers of sacrificial ritual demand, what
new levels of ferocity and brutality might be necessary to command the ·
dedicated loyalties of more extended communities of strangers?
Not that brutality has ever been partial to particular political forms.
Lynching, clan warfare, domestic violence, and slavery are all robust genres
in the familiar record of man's inhumanity, and none requires nation-states
for their expression. They remind us that enduring communities at every
level organize violence, like sex, to promote their own survival. The collective tension that surrounds violence does not arise, in the first instance,
from its destructiveness to individuals, but from the knowledge that energies so powerful can destroy the very communities they are deployed to
sustain. This powerful combination of creativity and destruction is part of
violence's religiously compelling aura. Whatever new computing technologies offer in the way of challenges and opportunities for the nation-state
will be faithfully manifest in the fortunes and misfortt1nes,. advances and
retreats, rewards and punishments of the interface between bodily violence
and increased textual coordination and control. To chart the most disruptive
consequences of the digital revolution, follow the bodies.

NOTES

Acknowledgments: The author acknowledges with thanks discussion of a numbe'r
of ideas in this essay at the "Place and Identity in an Age of Technologically Regulated Movement" workshop sponsored by th,, l\lational <:e,,ter fm· Geo,o,aphiclnfc,r- :

Peaceable Kingdoms and New Information Technologies

253

and Analysis Varenius Project to Advance Geographic Information Science,
8-10, 1998, Santa Barbara, California.
See Carolyn Marvin, When Old Technologies Were New: Thinking about Commuin the Late Nindeenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications
Cultural Transformations in Early-modern Europe, vols. 1 and 2 (Cambridge: Cam01.•, o,,a,eUniversity Press, 1979).
, 3. Harold A. Innis, Empire and Communications (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1972) and The Bias of Communication (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1951).
4. Benedict Anderson,Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991). A similar perspective is shared by Ernest
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).
5. E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 46.
6. Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 18.
7. Even this is no longer certain, but on the scale that replenishes national populations, reproduction will continue to be a face-to-face activity for the foreseeable
future.
8. For an extended analysis of nationalism and patriotism as civil religion, see
Carolyn Marvin and David W. Ingle, Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and
the American Flag (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
9. The classic discussion of this transformation is Norbert Elias, The Civilising
Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization, trans. Edemund
Jephcott (1939; Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1982).
10. See John Keegan, The History of Warfare (New York Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).
11. By "text" I refer throughout to mass-mediated messages, both printed writing

and printed images.
12. See Carolyn Marvin, "The Body of the Text: Literacy's Corporeal Constant,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech 80, no. 2 (May 1994): 129-49.
13. See Peter Burke, "The Repudiation of Ritual in Early Modern Europe," in The
Historical Anthropology of Early Modern Italy: Essays on Perception and Communication
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 223-38.
14. European regimental armies, the priestly classes of the new body-based religion of nationalism, were organized over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, just as ritual claims on the body by traditional Christianity were weakening.
15. Tom Nairn, Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited (London: Verso, 1997).
16. Jean-Marie Gu€henno, The End of the Nation-State, trans. Victoria Elliott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
17. Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting
(New York: Basic Books, 1973).
18. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York Avon
Books, 1992).

254

CAROLYN MARVIN

19. Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad Vs. Mc World: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995, 1996); Walter B. Wriston, The Twilight
of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming Our World (New York:

Scribners, 1992).
20. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
21. Edward Luttwak, Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy
(New York: HarperCollins, 1999).
22. Amy Harmon, "Worries About Big Brother at America Online," New York
Times, January 31, 1991, section 1, 20.
23. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University" Press, 1984).
24. James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).
25. John J. Mearsheimer, "Here We Go Again," New York Times, May 17, 1998,
section 4.

